Introduction
During the past few years, several authors have studied the problem of estimating systems of demand equations if a significant proportion of the observations in the sample contains zero expenditures on one or more goods. Wales and Woodland (1983) formulate a model based on the Kuhn-Tucker approach, which is consistent with utility-maximizing behaviour and allows for random preferences.
In case an explicit specification of the direct utility function is available, this approach seems very natural and intuitively appealing.
The individual is assumed to solve the problem maxG(x;ti,u) s.t. urx<l and
~20. Y
Here x is a K-dimensional vector of quantities, u is a K-dimensional vector of normalized prices (u, = pi/M, i = 1,. . . , K, where p, is the price of good i and M is income), G is the (direct) utility function, depending on a vector 8 of parameters (to be estimated) and a vector u of random variables (to allow for preference variation between individuals). Ransom (1987) (1974) for the special case of a quadratic utility function. He also discusses, for this special case, the issue of internal consistency, i.e., the question whether there is a one-to-one correspondence between all possible realizations of the random variables (except, perhaps, for those in a set of probability zero) and all possible quantity vectors x that could be observed (alternatively stated: do the probabilities sum to one?). In the literature, this property is also called coherency of the model [see, e.g., Gourieroux et al. (1980) ]. Ransom finds that internal consistency is guaranteed if the (quadratic) direct utility function is strictly concave on the set of feasible quantities {x; x 2 O}. This result is no surprise, since. if the utility function is strictly concave, (1) is an example of maximizing a strictly concave function over a (nonempty) compact convex set and standard Kuhn-Tucker theory assures us that this problem has one and only one solution. Lee and Pitt (1986) propose to use duality theory and shadow prices in the Wales and Woodland model to be able to deal with more flexible demand systems for which no explicit specification of the direct utility function can be given. In particular, they pay attention to the indirect translog system [see Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975) ]. Lee and Pitt do not address the issues of well-behaving of the indirect or direct utility function or internal consistency.
In an earlier paper [Van Soest and Kooreman (1986) ], we showed with a simple example in the three-goods case, that internal consistency can be severely violated for certain values of parameters of the indirect translog specification (which do not guarantee concavity of the direct utility function in a large enough region). In this paper we show that, provided that the parameters satisfy certain conditions, internal consistency is guaranteed and, moreover, that the direct utility function behaves well in the feasible region of the quantity-space, {x; U'X I 1 and x 2 0).
The framework
We start from the indirect utility function
J=l where p = (pl,. . ., pK)T is a vector of prices, M denotes income, (Y = ((Ye,. . . , (11~)~ is a parameter vector, which is normalized such that cf=,a; = -1 [a may include a random component, as in Lee and Pitt (1986) ], and
is a matrix of parameters. Without loss of generality, we assume that B is symmetric.
Introducing a vector u =P/M of normalized prices, the indirect utility function can be written as H(u) = i: a, log 0, + : 2 5 p,, log u, log u,.
I=1 r=l j=l
Note that
Since the indirect utility function must be increasing as a function of M, a necessary condition for the use of this specification in the neighbourhood of a given vector 0 is D*(u) =I -i: i: p,,1ogu;>o. Here s*(u) = (sT( u), . . . , sz( u))~ is the vector of optimal budget shares, some of which may be negative. We write z*(u) = (zp( u), . . . , z~(u))~.
Rationing
In the following, we consider a fixed vector u and we derive the optimal shares s, that satisfy s, 20 (i= l,..., K). With s=(si ,..., sK)r this can be written as s 2 0.
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, as in Lee and Pitt (1986) (and thus implicitly assuming, that the direct utility function 'behaves well in some large enough region'), the maximization problem can be written as: With y, = log ui -log r,, j = 1,. . . , K, y = (yl,. . . , y,)', and e = (1,. . . , l)T, this can be written as: The problem of internal consistency is illustrated by the following two examples with three commodities.
Example I.
Let and u= (l,l,l)r. The regions in a-space for which solutions for the different regimes exist are given in fig. 2 . In this case, for each (Y, system (3) yields exactly one solution and the model is internally consistent.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for internal consistency of the model. It is easily proved using the notation introduced to describe system (3). 
Concavity in the feasible region of the shares space
The cost function is only well-behaving in the neighbourhood of a vector 7~ of shadow prices corresponding to a given vector s of shares, if the matrix of second-order partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to prices is negative semidefinite.
This condition is equivalent to the requirement that the matrix of Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution be negative semidefinite, which, in case of the translog function, means that the matrix
must be negative semidefinite [see, e.g., Barnett et al. (1985) ]. Here A(s) denotes the diagonal matrix with si (i = 1,. . . , K) on the diagonal and y corresponds to s, i.e., ~1, = log u, -log rj, where rr = (a,, . . . , rK)T is the vector of shadow prices corresponding to the vector s of shares. 
Then concavity holds for the optimal vector of shares, i.e., the vector s > 0 corresponding to the solution of (3).

Proof.
The proof is an immediate consequence of the following two lemmas. This is a quadratic function of x's, with discriminant
D=4((xTBe)'-(xTBx)(eTBe)).
If B is positive definite, then D I 0 (Cauchy-Schwarz), so the function does not change sign and, because xTBx > 0, it is always nonnegative. W
Conclusion
Proposition 1 can intuitively be seen as a consequence of Proposition 2: Concavity of the cost function corresponds to concavity of the direct utility function on the feasible region S = {s; s 2 0 and sTe 5 l}. Since S is convex, the concave direct utility function attains a unique maximum on S.
The main problem left seems to be the question whether the assumptions (Al), (A2), and (A3) 
